Meeting Abstract

57.5  Sunday, Jan. 5 14:30  Why not lie? Costly signals enforce honesty in an experimental signaling game POLNASZEK, T.J.*; STEPHENS, D.W.; Univ. of Minnesota, Twin Cities; Univ. of Minnesota, Twin Cities polna005@umn.edu

Communication depends on reliable signals, so the concept of honesty is important in discussions of communication. Theory provides several mechanisms which can stabilize honesty, even in the face of conflicting interests. A particularly influential approach to studying honesty is the ‘handicap principle’, which predicts that the costs of signaling stabilize honesty. We tested this prediction using pairs of blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) in an experimental signaling game. While there is no doubt that many signals do have costs, we lack definitive experimental evidence showing that honesty persists when costs are high, and disappears when costs are low. Using our signaling game, we ask how increasing signal cost affects signaler strategy. The results show that signal cost has no influence on honesty if signalers and receivers share a common interest (signalers are consistently honest). Conversely, conflict between players causes dishonesty in low cost conditions. This deception decreases dramatically when signal costs increase. The approach we developed offers two distinct advantages; direct control over signal cost and a clear operational definition of honesty.